Abstract: Many stream ciphers use irregular clocking to introduce nonlinearity to the keystream. We present three distinguishers on irregularly clocked linear feedback shift registers. The general idea used is to find suitable linear combinations of keystream bits, here called samples, that are drawn from a biased distribution. We describe how to place windows around the estimated positions around members of the linear combinations, and very efficiently create many samples with low computational complexity. We also describe ideas based on constructing samples consisting of vectors of bits (words) instead of single binary samples. These vectors based methods can distinguish the cipher using fewer keystream bits but sometimes require a higher computational complexity.
INTRODUCTION
Since the standardisation of the block cipher AES Daemen and Rijmen (2002) a lot of attention in symmetric cryptology has moved to the area of stream ciphers. In many applications stream ciphers can offer advantages of different kinds, e.g., in situations when low power consumption is required, low hardware complexity or when we need extreme software efficiency. To ensure trust in the security claims of stream ciphers it is imperative that the security of stream ciphers is carefully studied and analysed.
A common building block in stream ciphers is a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). By using an LFSR with a primitive feedback polynomial, sequences with very long periods and good statistical properties can be achieved. LFSRs are also very suitable for fast implementation in hardware. Since LFSRs are linear, the initial state can easily be reconstructed from its output. Hence some nonlinearity has to be introduced. One common way is to use some binary values from the LFSR state and feed them through a nonlinear boolean function. Such stream ciphers are called filter generators. Another possibility is to decimate the sequence in an unpredictable way. Several such designs have been proposed, for example the shrinking generator, the self-shrinking generator and the alternating step. There are also designs that use both irregular clocking and boolean functions, for example LILI-128 and LILI-II.
In stream cipher cryptanalysis we usually consider the plaintext to be known, i.e., the keystream is known and we try to recover the key. Siegenthaler (1984) introduced the idea of exploiting the correlations in the keystream. As a consequence of this attack, nonlinear functions must have high nonlinearity.
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This attack was later followed by the fast correlation attack Meier and Staffelbach (1988) . In a fast correlation attack one first tries to find a low weight parity check polynomial of the LFSR and then applies some iterative decoding procedure. Many improvements have been introduced on this topic, see Canteaut and Trabbia (2000) ; Chepyzhov et al. (2000) ; Johansson and Jönsson (2002 , 1999a .
Algebraic attacks have received much interest lately. These attacks try to reduce the key recovery problem to the problem of solving a large system of algebraic equations, see Courtois and Meier (2003) ; Courtois (2003) .
In this paper we consider distinguishing attacks, a well known class of attacks. A distinguishing attack is a known keystream attack, i.e., we have access to some amount of the keystream and from this data we try to decide whether this data origins from the cipher we consider, or if the data appears to be random data, see e.g., Ekdahl and Johansson (2002) ; Golić and Menicocci (2003) ; Junod (2003) ; Watanabe et al. (2003) ; .
Throughout the paper we will consider stream ciphers that can be modelled as an irregularly clocked linear feedback shift register, where the sequence that determines the decimation is created in some arbitrary way. The only requirements that we assume are that we know the expected behaviour (e.g. expectation and variance) of the clock control sequence.
We start by returning to the ideas used in , where a very efficient distinguisher was described. We introduce new developments of this attack in two directions, which in general require less keystream but sometimes require a higher computational complexity. The general idea used in is to find suitable linear combinations of keystream bits, here called samples, that are drawn from a biased distribution. Collecting enough samples will enable us to detect whether the bias is present or not and thus learning whether the keystream sequence came from the considered cipher or if it was purely random. The ideas we describe in this paper are based on constructing samples consisting of vectors of bits (words) instead of single binary samples.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe irregularly clocked linear shift registers and discuss hypothesis testing. We then review the ideas described in in Section 3. In Section 4 we present a simple word based distinguisher. We introduce ideas on how to extend the word based attack by considering the distribution of the undecimated LFSR sequence, this is discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the the paper in Section 6. 
PRELIMINARIES

Irregularly clocked linear shift registers
We consider irregularly clocked binary stream ciphers where the output is taken from some decimated LFSR sequence.
As depicted in Figure 1 a binary LFSR produces a binary sequence denoted s = s 0 , s 1 , . . .. A clock control sequence denoted c = c 0 , c 1 , . . . is generated in some arbitrary way. This clock control sequence is used to decimate the LFSR sequence, i.e., to remove some symbols from the stream. The decimated sequence is denoted z = z 0 , z 1 , . . . and is used as the keystream. In other words, the clock control sequence uniquely determines a sequence of integers
and where
As usual, the keystream is added to the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. As a slightly more advanced model, we mention also the irregularly clocked filter generator. The irregular clocking is as before, but the keystream is now generated as
where f () is a boolean function in k variables. A general approach in cryptanalysis in this model would be to approximate f () by a linear function. This brings us back to the first model with some small modifications. Thus we focus on the first and simpler model.
Hypothesis testing
We give a brief introduction to binary hypothesis testing. In a binary hypothesis test we have two claims, namely that hypothesis H 0 is the explanation for an observed measurement, or alternatively that H 1 is the explanation for an observed measurement. In the test we try to decide which of the two hypothesis is the correct one.
Assume that we have a sequence of m independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m over an alphabet X . Its distribution is denoted Q(x) = P r(X i = x), 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the sample values obtained in an experiment are denoted x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m . We have the two hypotheses H 0 : Q = P 0 and H 1 : Q = P 1 , where P 0 and P 1 are two different distributions. To distinguish between the two hypotheses, one defines a decision function, φ : X m → {0, 1}. φ(x) = 0 implies that H 0 is accepted and φ(x) = 1 implies that H 1 is accepted.
Two probabilities of error are associated with the decision function, denoted α = P (φ(x) = 1|H 0 is true), and β = P (φ(x) = 0|H 1 is true). Let H 0 be the hypothesis that the distribution Q is induced by the cipher and let H 1 be the hypothesis that Q is uniform. The Neyman-Pearson lemma tells us how to carry out the actual test when we have a sequence of samples.
Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m be i.i.d. random variables drawn according to probability distribution Q. Consider the decision problem corresponding to the hypotheses Q = P 0 vs. Q = P 1 . For T ≥ 0 define a region
) be the error probabilities corresponding to the decision region A m . Let B be any other decision region with associated error probabilities α * and β
The region A m (T ) that is determined by
P1(x) > T , is the one that jointly minimizes α and β. In our case we consider α and β to be equal and hence T = 1. This gives us the test
The ratio in (1) is called a log-likelihood ratio, and the test is thus called a log-likelihood test. Finally, we note that the number of samples we need to collect in order to reliably distinguish between the two distributions is roughly
where D(P 0 , P 1 ) is the relative entropy defined as
P1(x) . If P 1 is the uniform distribution, D(P 0 , P 1 ) = log |X | − H(P 0 ), where H(P 0 ) is the entropy function. We use this relative entropy as our measure of bias.
The statistical distance, denoted ε, between P 0 , P 1 is defined as
Furthermore, if P 0 is very close to a uniform distribution
For a more thorough treatment of hypothesis testing, we refer to any textbook on the subject, e.g. Cover and Thomas (1991).
AN EFFICIENT DISTINGUISHER
In an efficient distinguisher was introduced for irregularly clocked filter generators. The attack is based on a low weight recurrence relation for the LFSR sequence in the form
where w is the weight of the recurrence. If the LFSR recurrence relation is not of low weight, the first step would be to find such a low weight recurrence relation. This is discussed below. Looking at the keystream as the decimated LFSR sequence, and assuming z t = s t for some t , t we would like to identify where in keystream we can find s t+τ1 etc. Due to the irregular clocking, this can in general not be determined. However, instead we can determine where s t+τ1 is likely to have appeared (if at all). The idea is to place windows around the most likely positions of appearance. From the number of zeros inside the windows it is easy to calculate P (s t+τ1 = 0) etc. conditioned on the keystream.
To support a very fast implementation of these ideas we proceed a bit differently. Every possible combination of one position from each window xored together is referred to as a sample. We basically just keep the number of zeros inside each window in memory, and from this information we can easily calculate how many possible ways we can combine one symbol from each window such that it fulfils the recurrence equation. The advantage of this procedure is that the numbers of zeros in a window is easily updated when moving the windows, and hence at each time instant one receives many samples with a very low computational complexity. These ideas are now described in more detail.
Finding a low weight multiple
As in many attacks, such as fast correlation attacks and distinguishing attacks, we explore a low weight recurrence relations of the LFSR sequence, i.e., a recursion of weight w for the LFSR sequence s that adds to zero for all time instances t, see (4).
If the weight of the original feedback polynomial is too high, it is possible to find multiples of the polynomial that has a lower weight. Several methods of finding such multiples have been proposed. Some methods focus on finding multiples with as low weight as possible, while some other methods accept a higher weight but reduce the complexity of finding the multiple.
Assume that we have a feedback polynomial g(x) of degree r and search for a multiple of weight w, According to Golić (1996) , the critical degree when these multiples start to appear is (w − 1)! 1/(w−1) 2 r/(w−1) . Golić (1996) also describes an algorithm that focuses on finding multiples of degree around the critical degree. The first step is to calculate the residues x i mod g(x), then one computes the residues x i1 + . . .
with n being the maximum degree of the multiples. The last step is to use fast sorting to find all of the zero and one matches of the residues from the second step. The complexity of this algorithm is approximately O(S log S) with S = Wagner (2002) presented a generalization of the birthday problem, i.e., given k lists of r-bit values, find a way to choose one element from each list, so that these k values XOR to zero. This algorithm finds a multiple of weight w = k + 1 using lower computational complexity, k · 2 r/(1+ log k ) , than the method described above, on the expense of higher degree, which is 2 r/(1+ log k ) . Since the number of samples is of high concern to us we choose to work with the method described in Golić (1996) .
In the attack we focus on using a multiple of weight three in the form
The complexity of finding this multiple is roughly 2 r/2 and the expected degree of this multiple is also approximately 2 r/2 , where r denotes the degree of the original LFSR. It is also possible to mount the attack with multiples of higher weight. Using a multiple of higher weight lowers the degree of the multiple, but the probability that one or several of the members are decimated also increases. So from now on we assume that we use a weight three recurrence relation as in (5).
Positioning the windows
Consider again the weight three relation, but now with irregular clocking. We denote by C the random variable giving the number of clocks between two consecutive keystream symbols, P (C) its distribution and E(C) the expectation of C. The size of the windows depends on the distance from the fixed position, hence we will fix the centre position in the recurrence and use windows around the other two positions. We rewrite the recurrence as
Assume that at time instant t, none of the terms in the above equation is decimated, i.e., they all appear somewhere in the key stream. Considering a fixed position t in the keystream, we would like to estimate the distance from z t = s t to z t −τ 1 = s t−τ1 , and also the distance between z t = s t and z t +τ 2 −τ 1 = s t+τ2−τ1 , i.e., the values of τ 1 and τ 2 . This decimation is illustrated in Figure 2 .
The expected distance between the outputs from the LFSR, corresponding to input s t−τ1 and s t , is τ 1 /E(C). Similarly the expected distance between s t and s t+τ2−τ1 is τ2−τ1 E(C) . So we will place one window around the position t − τ 1 /E(C) and another window around the position t + τ2−τ1 E(C) . Figure 2 : Decimated LFSR sequence.
Determining the size of the windows
The output sequence from the clock-control part, denoted by c t , is assumed to have a fixed distribution independent of t. By using the central limit theorem we know that the sum of a large number of random variables approaches the normal distribution. So
, where n denotes the number of observed symbols and σ c the standard deviation for the clocking sequence.
If we choose the window size sufficiently large, the desired position will be located inside the window with a high probability. Since
we choose a window size of approximately four standard deviations.
Estimation of the number of required samples
Having established the location and size of windows, the main idea of the distinguishing attack is now to create samples of the form
where w 1 is any position inside the first window and w 2 is any position inside the second window. We will run through all such possible combinations. As will be demonstrated, each sample is drawn according to a biased distribution. To determine how many bits we need to observe to reliably distinguish the cipher from a random source, we need to estimate the bias. We denote the window sizes by r 1 and r 2 . Note that we are calculating a number of samples, and that for every time instant we get r 1 · r 2 new samples. Assume that at time t none of the members in the recurrence relation is decimated. Then among all r 1 ·r 2 constructed samples, one will correspond to the actual recurrence relation and thus will always sum to zero, contributing with the bias 1/2. The other r 1 · r 2 − 1 samples are assumed to be random. So the distribution for one sample can then roughly be calculated as
and the statistical distance
where p dec denotes the probability that none of the three members in the recursion is decimated. In the approximation we neglect the probability that the correct position in some cases deviates more than two standard deviations from the expected position. In practice, this would lead to a slightly smaller bias.
We can now estimate how many keystream bits we need to observe, in order to make a correct decision. If the distributions are smooth (close to uniform), the number of variables N we need to observe is N ≈ 1/ε 2 samples in order to reliably distinguish between the two distributions, see for example Coppersmith et al. (2002) . Note that the error probabilities are decreasing exponentially with N . At each time instant we receive r 1 · r 2 new samples, and hence the total number of bits we need for the distinguisher can be estimated by
Complexity of calculating the samples
The strength of the distinguisher lies in the fact that the calculation of the number of ones and zeros in the windows can be performed very efficiently. When we move the centre position from z t to z t+1 we also move the windows one step to the right. We denote the number of zeros in window one and two by P Zwin1 t , and P Zwin2 t , respectively. The number of samples that fulfil z w1 + z t + z w2 = 0 at time t is denoted P W t , where w 1 , w 2 are any pair of positions in window one and window two, respectively. When moving the windows we get P
Zwin1 t+1
from P Zwin1 t by adjusting corresponding to the bit leaving the window and the one entering the window, e.g. P Zwin1 t+1
where p = 1 if a one is leaving the window and a zero entering, p = −1 if it is the opposite, and p = 0 otherwise. From the P
and P
Zwin2 t+1
we can, with few basic computations, calculate P Although the number of zeros in the windows P are dependent of the number of zeros in the previous window P Zwin1 t , P Zwin2 t , the covariance between the number of samples received at time instant t and t + 1 is zero, Cov(P W t+1 , P W t ) = 0, see .
The last step in the attack is to determine whether the collected data really is biased. A rough method for the hypothesis test is to check whether the result deviates more than two standard deviations from the expected result in the case when the bits are truly random. In Englund and 1. Find a weight three multiple of the LF SR recurrence. 2. Determine the expected centre positions of the windows. 3. Calculate the sizes, r 1 and r 2 , of the windows. 4. Calculate the bias ε. 5. Calculate the number of bits N we need to observe. 6. for t from 0 to N if zt = 0 | > √ N · r 1 · r 2 output "cipher" otherwise "random". Johansson. (2005) it was shown that the standard deviation for a sum of these samples, can be estimated by σ = N r1r2 4 .
Summary of previous attack
The described attack is summarized in Figure 3 . In this figure,
is the total number of zero samples out of a total of N ·r 1 ·r 2 samples. Simulation results for the attack were presented in .
AN EFFICIENT DISTINGUISHER USING
VECTORIAL SAMPLES
In the previous section an efficient distinguisher was created by adding binary symbols from different windows in the keystream. The natural step to improve this strategy is to consider a word based attack. Instead of considering the number of zeros and ones inside the windows, we increase the alphabet size and count words (vectors of consecutive bits) inside the windows and around the centre member of the weight three recurrence equation. In this section the idea of using words is applied directly on the keystream, i.e., a length two word would be of the form (z t , z t+1 ).
We start by considering the calculation and storage of the number of different words inside the two windows. Let P Zwin1 t now denote the (empirical) distribution of words in window one and P Zwin2 t the same in window two. The word at the centre position of the recurrence relation is denoted Z t . Note that we can maintain an effective updating procedure for these distribution, i.e., P
Zwin1 t+1
Zwin2 t+1
are easily updated from P The disadvantage of the proposed procedure, compared to the previous method is that the complexity of calculating the overall number of samples of a certain value increases with larger word size. Using a larger alphabet means a higher computational complexity to calculate the number of ways to add the words in the different windows.
On the other hand we expect a higher bias in a word based 
Convolution of large distributions
As described, the main idea of the distinguishing attack using word size b is to create samples of the form
where the word (z w1 , z w1+1 , . . . , z w1+b−1 ) is any word inside the first window and (z w2 , z w2+1 , . . . , z w2+b−1 ) is any word inside the second window. The total number of samples created at time t is r 1 · r 2 , where now r 1 is the number of words inside the first window, etc. Consider the two stored tables P
Zwin1 t
Zwin2 t
containing the number of different words inside each window as empirical distributions. Then at each time instant in the attack we need to perform a convolution of two such distributions. This is a time consuming operation if the distributions are large. A trivial calculation of the convolution of two distributions of size n has complexity O(2 2n ). However, it has been demonstrated, see for example Maximov and Johansson (2005) that convolutions over bitwise addition of two large distribution can be performed via Fast Hadamard Transform (FHT) with complexity O(n · 2 n ).
An example
Consider the case when we have a keystream according to Figure 4 . In the example we have window sizes of 12 bits and we use vectors of length two. The first step is to calculate the number of words in each window. The next step is to calculate in how many ways we can add together one word from each window and the centre word to get a specific word. For example, calculating in how many ways we can combine (add bitwise) words from the windows to get the bitwise modulo two sum (0, 1). The centre word in the recurrence is assumed to be (1, 0), so we need to find all combinations adding to (1, 1). That would be 0 · 1 + 3 · 2 + 2 · 2 + 6 · 6 = 46 samples having value (0, 1) out of a total of 121 samples. The calculation is illustrated in Figure 4 . 
Rough theoretical estimates for word size two
For word size two, we create samples W l , of the form
where w 1 is any position in the first window and w 2 is any position in the second window. We will run through all such possible combinations. Let us assume that at time t we consider (z t , z t+1 ) and suitably placed windows. With probability (1 − p dec ) some symbol in the first relation is not present and with the same probability (1 − p dec ) some symbol in the second relation is not present. We get four possibilities, one being the sample drawn according to the uniform distribution, happening with probability (1 − p dec ) 2 . Another being the sample draw according to a distribution where the first coordinate is zero, happening with probability (1 − p dec )p dec . The same probability holds when the second second recursion holds and the second coordinate is zero, and finally all LFSR symbols in both relations are in place with probability p Clearly, a similar analysis can be done for larger word sizes.
Summary of attack
The proposed attack using words is summarized in Figure  5 . The distribution P 0 (x), ∀x ∈ X is determined through simulation before the attack and needs only be done once. A convolution of P 
Simulation results
To verify the effectiveness of our ideas we implemented the attack on an irregularly clocked LFSR. The simulation results are based on the step-one-step-two generator, i.e., at every time instant an LFSR producing the keystream is clocked one or two times, i.e., c t ∈ {1, 2} with equal probability. Hence E(C) = 1.5 and V (C) = 2.5, the generator is illustrated in Figure 6 . For LF SR c we used the primitive trinomial x 41 +x 20 +1, and for LF SR s we used the primitive trinomial x 3660 + x 1637 + 1. We fix the central member of the feedback polynomial. The centre position for window one will be positioned at t − τ 1 /E(C) = t − 3660−1637 1.5 = t − 1349, and at t + τ2−τ1 E(C) = t − 1637 1.5 = t + 1091 for window two. We use window sizes of four standard deviations, i.e., r 1 = 4 √ 2.5 · 1349 = 232 and r 2 = 4 √ 2.5 · 1091 = 209. We can compare the bit oriented approach from the previous section (corresponding to vector size 1) with the new word based approach. Simulation results for different vector sizes are presented in Table 1 , where the divergence between the empirical distribution of the cipher ,P 0 , and the uniform distribution, P 1 , is denoted by D(P 0 , P 1 ). By using larger vector sizes we can achieve a higher bias, and thus fewer keystream bits are needed for the attack. However, the computational complexity may be higher. In situations where the number of keystream bits are more important than the computational complexity the idea with vectors may be of great interest.
CONSIDERING WORDS IN THE
UNDECIMATED SEQUENCE
Instead of considering words in the keystream sequence we
Figure 7: Keystream generated using c t ∈ {1, 2}.
can estimate the distribution of words in the undecimated sequence of LF SR s . These words can have a different word size than in the decimated sequence. A word in the keystream is as before denoted Z t = (z t , z t+1 , . . . , z t+b−1 ), and a corresponding word of size d in the undecimated LFSR stream is denoted by S t = (s t , s t+1 , . . . , s t+d−1 ). Consider the case depicted in Figure 7 . In this figure we consider keystream words of size two and the decimation is done according to c t ∈ {1, 2} with equal probability. The distribution of the undecimated words will be skew, e.g., P (S = 111|Z = 00) = 0. The probabilities P (S t |Z t ), ∀S t , Z t , can be precomputed. For simplicity, our considerations are purely combinatorial. Each observed Z vector in a window will give rise to a number of samples for the S vector. In the previous example, an observed Z = (00) would give 4 possible samples for S, namely two samples with value S = (000) one with value S = (001) and one with value S = (010).
When performing the attack, as in the previous section, windows are placed around the expected positions of members in the recurrence relation. Let us denote the empirical distributions of the corresponding undecimated words of size d as P In the cipher case, we are looking at an equation of the form S t−τ1 + S t + S t+τ2−τ1 = 0, t ≥ 0.
The final procedure is almost exactly as in the previous section. We have an empirical distribution of S t−τ1 in the array P Swin1 t , etc., and we estimate of the distribution of S t−τ1 + S t + S t+τ2−τ1 through the convolution of P . This distribution is denoted P W t . By computing the convolution via Fast Hadamard Transform the complexity of these calculations can, as mentioned in Section 4.1, be significantly lowered.
Finally, by summing over all t, we obtain the empirical distribution P W . As before, this needs to be checked against the uniform distribution and possibly some experimentally verified P 0 (x).
An outline of the proposed attack is depicted in Figure , and P Table 2 : D(P 0 , P 1 ) using words in undecimated sequence.
on a step-one-step-two generator and compared the attack with the bit oriented attack presented in Section 3. The cipher used in the simulation is the same used in Section 4.5. The results are summarized in the Table 2 , where b and d denotes the size of the words in the decimated respectively the undecimated sequence, D(P 0 , P 1 ) denotes the divergence between the simulated empirical distribution and the uniform distribution. In the example the gain of using vectors in the undecimated sequence is not very large, but on other ciphers the gain might be larger. Using larger words in the decimated sequence similarly as in Section 4 can also be considered to improve the attack. It can be noted that for each bit in the undecimated attack we receive more samples than for each bit in the bit oriented attack.
CONCLUSIONS
We propose three distinguishers for irregularly clocked stream ciphers. The first attack distinguishes the cipher with very low computational complexity. Using vectors of keystream bits, a procedure was shown that requires fewer keystream bits but possibly a higher complexity to distinguish the cipher. Finally an idea for a distinguisher that estimates the distribution of the undecimated LFSR stream was proposed.
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